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FRANCES LEWIS LAW CENTER PROJECT
A STATUTORY APPROACH TO IMPLIED WARRANTIES
ON NEW RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION*
I. IN RODUCTION
If the law were to respond solely to the teachings of positive economics,
it would usually place the risk of loss in a private transaction or occurrence
on the party who can avoid or assume the risk at the least net cost. The
law would include within the cost calculation not only direct expenses of
preventing or rectifying the loss, but indirect transaction costs such as
those involved in gathering and disseminating information to all persons
who may need it. In effect, the risk would normally be placed on the party
who would incur the least cost in obtaining and assimilating the relevant
information about its nature and magnitude.' The law would also engen-
der, within cost-benefit limitations, what might be called an "informed-
risk'market place" which would enable parties with adequate information
about potential or realized risks to reallocate the risks as their respective
economic interests might dictate.
On the other hand, if the law were to respond solely to common percep-
tions of fairness or justice, it would protect the weaker party when a loss
arises from a private transaction or occurrence, unless the weaker party
caused the loss through some fault of his own. In any event, "fair" and
"just" systems of law would not rely on such blanket loss-allocating rules
as caveat emptor without introducing notions related to relative bargain-
ing power and fault.'
Happily, both these approaches-the efficiency-oriented and the
fairness-oriented-can be reconciled when the risk involves defects in
newly manufactured or constructed property, including dwellings. In a
time of mass production of increasingly elaborate homes and rapidly rising
prices, the party to a new home sale with the least-cost access to informa-
* Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., John A. Fraser EII, Robert S. Link, Jr., and Barbara Ann
Rezner. Professor Kirgis is Professor of Law and Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center,
Washington and Lee University School of Law. Messrs. Fraser and Link and Ms. Rezner are
John Marshall Fellows of the Virginia Bar Association and third-year students at the Wash-
ington and Lee University School of Law. This project has been carried out by the Frances
Lewis Law Center in collaboration with the Real Estate Committee of the Virginia Bar
Association, and has benefitted from the critical comments of the Committee. The named
authors, however, bear the sole responsibility for its form, content and accuracy.
See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsis OF LAw 50-51, 89 (1972).
2 The rule of caveat emptor is based on the supposition that the parties have equal access
to relevant information. See 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4470 (1963). This assumption
is rarely true today in the housing market. See 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 938.5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as POWELL].
The modem trend away from caveat emptor in sales of new homes began with Miller v.
Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113, an English case involving the sale of a house
still under construction. The trend has taken hold in the United States in the last 20 years.
See the cases cited in note 3 infra.
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tion as to quality and with the clearest risk-avoidance capability normally
will be the party who sets the terms of the transaction-the builder or
seller. Rules can be devised to place the risk of loss (within reasonable
limits) from construction defects on that party, unless the buyer has
enough information to be an efficient cost-avoider and an adequate bar-
gainer. Moreover, a market can be made available for the transfer of risks
between the parties, subject to nonburdensome safeguards.
This can be done by the courts, deciding one issue at a time over a
period of years (as many states have begun to do),3 or by state legislatures,
or by a combination of the two. If legislation embodies a unified, balanced
and efficient body of rules, the legislative process is preferable to a case
by case approach. But the legislative schemes which have been enacted or
proposed are either so cryptic that they fail to resolve the difficult issues,,
or so elaborate that they have little chance of widespread legislative adop-
tion or of efficient operation if they are adopted.
5
The major issues raised by residential warranties are posed, but not
resolved, in Section II below. Section HI resolves them with a unified,
balanced statutory scheme, followed by a commentary explaining the ra-
tionale behind the statutory provisions.
See Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark.
1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.3d 374, 525 P.2d 88,
115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (apartment building); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.
2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964);
Tucker v. Crawford, 315 A.2d 737 (Del. Super. 1974); Gable v. Silver, 264 So.2d 418 (Fla.
1972) (condominium); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v.
Dye, 4 111. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300
(1972); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Weeks v. Slavic Builders, 24 Mich.
App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Brown v. Elton
Chalk, Inc., 358 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1978); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo.
1972); Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44
N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d
557 (1976); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973); Tibbs v. National Homes Const.
Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Homes Const. Co.,
576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Elderkin v.
Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29.
298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner
v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. 1968); Tibbets v. Oppenshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967); Rothberg v.
Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199
(1969); Taveres v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). But see Amos v. McDonald, 123
Ga. App. 509, 181 S.E.2d 515 (1971); Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 219 Va. 287, 247 S.E.2d
400 (1978).
' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-116 to 47-120, 52-563a (West 1978 and Supp.
1979); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to 10-205 (1974 and Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 55-
70.1 (Supp. 1979).
1 See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS Acr §§ 1-101 to 2-521.
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
H1. WARRANTY ISSUES
A. Age and Intended Use of the Building
Implied warranties could be limited to new homes, since buyers of such
homes have the greatest justification for expecting mint-condition prod-
ucts.' If limited to new homes, the warranties could apply only to those sold
before completion, since full inspection by the buyer or his agent would be
impossible, or they could attach also to those completed and then sold,
since an inspection thorough enough to uncover latent defects usually is
not feasible even when construction is finished.
7
On the other hand, implied warranties could be extended to sales of
previously-occupied homes, giving the law's protection to all home buyers.
If the warranties apply to some used homes, they might extend only to
newly-remodeled homes since such buyers' expectations are similar to
those of new home buyers.8
Warranties could be restricted to owner-occupied single-family dwell-
ings, protecting persons with high stakes in the premises and avoiding the
need to draw difficult lines among various ownership and possessory ar-
rangements and various sizes of building. If the warranties are extended
beyond owner-occupied single-family dwellings, they might apply to leased
single-family dwellings (since lessee-occupiers, like owner-occupiers, have
an interest in safe, habitable living quarters), duplexes, apartment houses
and condominiums (since people who live in a building with others have
the same interest), or only to some of these Implied warranties might
apply to multiple-family buildings only up to a given number of occupants,
to avoid the burdens on warrantors and on the legal system of trying to
define and regulate warranties extending to large and shifting numbers of
people in the same building. Mobile homes could be covered by the same
warranties or be left to warranties on sales of goods. Implied warranties
I Most states have specifically limited the application of the warranty to new homes. See;
e.g., H.B. Bolas Enterprises v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447 (1965); Brown v. Elton
Chalk, Inc., 358 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1978); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199
(1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-116, 52-563a (West 1978 and Supp. 1979); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201(b), 10-203(a) (1974); VA. CODE § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1979).
" At least one case has declined to imply warranties as to work completed before a new
residence is sold. See Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966). 6 POWELL,
supra note 2, at 938.6[l], suggests that the degree of completion should no longer be a
factor in determining whether or not to imply a warranty.
I To date City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973), seems to be
the only case implying a warranty in the sale of a remodeled home. In Miles v. Love, 1 Kan.
App. 2d 630, 573 P.2d 622 (1977), the court refused to imply a warranty in the sale of a
remodeled home, but pointed out that the defects had existed prior to the remodeling. See
also Note, Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habituation in Sale of Residential Dwellings, 43
DEN. L.J. 379 (1966); Note, Caveat Emptor-A Pierced Shield, 15 DEPAuL L. REv. 440 (1966).
' See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974) (apartment building); Gable v. Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd mem.,
264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (condominium); Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App. 446, 557 P.2d
24 (1976) (four-unit apartment complex).
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could even attach to purely commercial buildings, on a theory of equal
protection for all who have substantial financial stakes in buildings.'"
B. Nature of the Warranty
The law could be designated to cover only the most egregious case,
leaving the market to take care of the rest. Thus the warranty could cover
only cases in which the buyer's purpose is completely frustrated, as when
a home turns out to be uninhabitable." On the other hand, the warranty
could be designed to effectuate the normal expectations of the buyer. A
buyer of a new home usually expects not only that the building is habita-
ble, but that it meets some higher standard of functionality and durability.
That standard could be described in a number of ways, such as workman-
like construction, accepted engineering methods, and compliance with
local ordinances.'
2
Another question is whether only the main structural work should be
covered, or whether materials incorporated into the building should also
be included. 3 In the latter case, the owner or builder would have to warrant
,0 Acmat Corp. v. Beckstein, No. 201445 (Conn. Super. Ct., decided March 23, 1978)
(demurrer overruled to count alleging breach of implied warranty in the sale of a commercial
building). Uniform Land Transactions Act § 2-309 would establish a warranty of suitability
for all real estate, not merely housing. See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONs Acr § 2-309, Com-
ment 1.
1, See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Gable v.
Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd mem., 264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795
(Mo. 1972); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973). See also Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash.
2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (no breach of implied warranty where defects did not affect
habitability).
2 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976); Norton
v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975). Warranties of compliance with local building
codes are usually linked with warranties of habitability, fitness or workmanlike construction.
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); David v. B. & J. Holding
Corp., 349 So.2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App. 446, 557
P.2d 24 (1976). Cf. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 651 (1965) (suggests implied warranty of merchantable quality)
[herinafter cited as Haskell].
Other cases combine more than one warranty. See, e.g., Columbia Western Corp. v. Vela,
122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (1979); Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1978);
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771
(1972); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Waggoner v.
Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d
1275 (Wyo. 1975). Statutory warranties typically combine more than one standard. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118 (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a) (Supp.
1978); VA CODE § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1979); UNIFORM LAND TRANSAcTMONs AcT § 2-309. See also
the proposed statutory warranties in 6 POWELL, supra note 2, at 1 938.9, App. B. § 464(2);
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L.
REv. 541, 576-77 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bearman].
,3 For cases indicating that the warranty made by the builder includes the materials
used, see Clark v. Campbell, 492 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1972); and Langley v. Helms, 12 N.C. App.
620, 184 S.E.2d 393 (1971). For statutory imposition of a warranty of the materials used, see
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against some defects not of his own making, but the protected person
would be able to look to a single party for coverage against all significant
structural defects.
The warranty could protect against defects outside the main building,
such as those in septic systems, detached garages or landscaping, since
those defects can affect enjoyment of the premises as much as defects in
the building." By limiting the warranty to the main building, however,
legislators could cover most of the significant defects while avoiding some
line-drawing problems. Perhaps only latent defects should be covered,
leaving the warrantee to assume the risks of defects he could find by
inspection, or coverage could extend even to reasonably discoverable de-
fects in order to avoid disputes as to what is or is not latent.'5
C. The Warranting Party
The builder is often the owner during construction. If he is not, the
question arises whether builder, owner or both should be liable for breach
of an implied warranty. Arguments could be made either way: the builder
has direct control over the work, and the owner may not be able to oversee
each detail sufficiently to be reasonably held responsible; but the owner
normally does have the power to control the builder, and the buyer deals
only with the owner.'"
Liability rules could also be framed to reach construction lenders, at
least if they are active participants in the project (thus giving protected
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118 (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(a) (Supp.
1978); and UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-309(b)(1).
1' See Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972) (sewer line and drain tile); Lyon
v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446. 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976) (water well); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or.
635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974) (septic tank and drain field); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407,
175 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (septic tank). Patio, driveway and garage defects have also given rise
to litigation, though not always under an implied warranty theory. See Scribner v. O'Brien,
169 Conn. 389, 363 A.2d 160 (1975); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966);
Moore v. Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See also Shiffers v. Cunningham
Shepherd Builders Co.., 470 P.2d 593 (Colo. App. 1970) (warranty covered proper grading of
lot); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975) (implied warranty that land
would support septic tank or sewage disposal system where restrictive covenant limited use
to single-family dwelling).
," Some statutes exclude implied warranties for reasonably discoverable conditions. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118(b) (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(b)
(1974). Other statutes do not have such an exclusion.'See VA. CODE § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1979);
UNIFORm LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-309. In Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342
N.E.2d 619, 621 (1976), the court said that "the defect in question must be latent or hidden."
See also Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557, 567 (1976).
,1 The cases often formulate the rule in terms of a builder-seller's warranty. See, e.g.,
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111
R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973). In Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975), however,
the court held that the business of selling rather than the business of construction gave rise
to the warranty. See also Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
Haskell argues that warranties should be implied "[w]hether the seller is an amateur or a
professional." See Haskell, supra note 12, at 649.
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parties an additional source of recovery, and giving lenders an incentive
to see that proper construction methods and materials are used).17 Various
forms of suretyship could be required, to protect against empty recoveries
from impecunious warrantors.15
D. Beneficiaries of the Warranty
The warranty would benefit the first purchaser, or long-term lessee if
warranties apply to leases. 9 It might also extend to the purchaser's imme-
diate family, to others lawfully on the premises, or to subsequent purchas-
ers and their families or invitees.2° A case can be made for any of these
11 Traditionally the lender was not liable unless the plaintiff could prove that the con-
struction lender was engaged in a joint venture with the builder-vendor. Note, Lender-
Vendor's Liability for Structural Defects in New Housing, 53 DEN. L.J. 413 (1976). Statutes
likewise have refrained from imposing liability on the lender. In Connecticut the warranty is
made by a vendor. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-116, 47-118, (West 1978). See also MD. REAL
PaoP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201, 10-203 (1974); VA. CODE § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1979).
In Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 447 P.2d 609, 615, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 375 (1968), the court held a lender liable on a negligence theory, without a finding
of joint venture. In that case, however, the lender had taken an active part in the construction
project. Contrast Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969), which found
no duty owed by the lender to the purchaser for workmanship. The California legislature also
limited the effect of Connor. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434 (West 1970). In the usual case the lender
will not be sufficiently involved in the project to be held liable for defects. See, e.g., Callai-
zakis v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972); Schenectady Say. Bank v.
Bartosik, 77 Misc. 2d 391, 353 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1974); Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 221 Pa.
Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973). The normal lender would not be a warrantor under the
Uniform Land Transactions Act §§ 2-309 & 2-310.
,8 Few municipalities require developers to be licensed. Even fewer require a bond to
guarantee payment of any tort or contract liability. A combination of these devices might help
assure injured parties a source of funds from which a judgment could be satisfied. 3 POWELL,
supra note at 2, at 386.6[6].
Another problem arises when a development corporation dissolves after completion of
one project and then reincorporates as a new company for the next one. Corporate dissolution
statutes might be amended to provide that reserves for contingent liabilities for the benefit
of purchasers of new homes be established before dissolution. Id.
," The most restrictive view would limit the warranty to first purchasers. See Brown v.
Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1978). Statutes dealing with warranty beneficiaries
have not mentioned subsequent purchasers. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-116 (West 1978);
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-201(c) (1974); VA. CODE § 55-70.1 (Supp. 1979). In Coburn
v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977), the court held that the warranty
created by CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 52-563a (West. Supp. 1979), did not run to second
purchasers. See also 6 POWELL, supra note 2, at 938.6[2], and Bearman, supra note 11, at
577. One model statute would extend the warranty to subsequent purchasers within six years.
Comment, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability-Explanation and
Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. REv. 185, 217, 219 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Home Implied
Warranty].
11 The warranty was extended to a subsequent purchaser in Braned v. Mac Brown & Co.,
264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). See also Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965) (purchasers' lessee and member of his family could enforce implied war-
ranty); Taveres v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975) (dictum suggesting that war-
ranty might benefit subsequent purchaser in an appropriate case).
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extensions by arguing that once an implied warranty is created it should
protect all who stand to suffer from covered defects. Put another way,
perhaps the warranting party should not escape liability simply because
he is fortunate enough to have the harm affect someone other than the first
purchaser. On the other hand, perhaps the law ought not to protect those
who do not rely directly on the warrantor.
If the warranty does not run automatically to subsequent purchasers,
it might be assignable by the first purchaser as most contract rights would
be. Eligible assignees could be defined to avoid the burden on warrantors
that could result from an open market in assignable warranties. Permissi-
ble methods of assignment might be designated, in order to remove ques-
tions about the effectiveness of any given assignment.
E. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
The parties might be permitted to bargain away all implied warranties
on the theory that a warranty is an asset that the purchaser should be able
to buy or not, as he wishes. At the other extreme, the parties could be
prohibited from changing any warranty in any way, arguing that to permit
bargaining is simply to strip the purchaser of the intended protection.2 ' A
middle ground would permit the parties to modify the warranties, subject
to some safeguards for the purchaser (and perhaps for the public) .21 If the
middle ground is taken, the safeguards must be clearly defined and must
not be so burdensome as to render the bargaining option illusory.
F. Remedies
Remedies for breach of warranty might include rescission,2 recovery for
loss of bargain,24 and the award of incidental and/or consequential dam-
"2 Courts have justified implied warranties on residences by stressing consumer ignorance
of modem home construction and reliance on the builder's knowledge. See Yepsen v. Burgess,
269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974). If the buyer is adequately informed and is protected against
overreaching, it may not be necessary to insulate him from the consequences of his own
bargain.
It is arguable that the federal Magnunson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1976), applies to appliances sold as fixtures in houses. See Peters, How the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act Affects the Builder/Seller of New Housing, 5 REAL EsT. L.J. 338 (1977). If this
theory is followed, it could affect the seller's power to exclude or modify the implied warranty
on houses, insofar as it applies to appliances. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
n Typical statutory safeguards attempt to insure that the buyer knows what he is signing
and to avoid any waiver until the construction is sufficiently complete to permit inspection.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118(d) (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203(d)
(1974); VA. CODE § 55-70/1(C) (Supp. 1979). The Virginia provision contains only the former
type of safeguard.
2 Rescission was held to be a proper remedy in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966), and Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974).
21 The usual measure would be cost of repair. See Duffy v. Woodcrest Builders, Inc., 2
Conn. Cir. 137, 196 A.2d 606 (1963); Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa 1972);
Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467,
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ages."1 Rescission may be the only effective remedy for one whose expecta-
tions are completely frustrated, as when the residence is uninhabitable, yet
the prospect of rescission could cloud land titles and make mortgage loans
difficult to obtain. The other remedies do not pose these problems.
Several remedies might be provided for the same breach, so long as no
economic waste or unjust enrichment results. In fairness, the remedies
might be made available only if prompt notice of the breach is given to
the warranting party and he fails to remedy the situation. Punitive dam-
ages might be imposed when there is callous disregard of the safety or
health of protected persons."
The parties might be permitted to limit remedies and stipulate liqui-
dated damages in their contract. Roughly the same considerations that
determine their power to exclude or modify warranties would apply.2
G. Duration of warranty protection
Products are normally warranted for a specified length of time. Resi-
dences can be too; if so, the duration should reflect the relatively long
expected life of residences. 28 As an alternative, residences can be warranted
to be in a stated condition as of an ascertainable date. The latter approach
is consistent with the nature of construction warranties, which deal with
defects that exist, if at all, when the work is completed. In either case there
will be an applicable statute of limitations, which could begin to run when
the breach occurs, when it is first discovered, when it should have been
discovered, or at some other point.29 If the statute begins to run when the
346 A.2d 210 (1975). If repair entails economic waste, the measure is the difference in value
between the house as warranted and as built. See Levesque v. D & M Builders, Inc., 170 Conn.
177, 365 A.2d 1216 (1976); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973). The Uniform Land
Transactions Act § 2-513(1) gives the buyer the choice between cost of repair and difference
in value, so long as repair would not involve economic waste.
2 See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONs Acr § 2-513(1), 2-514. Consequential damages for
personal injury were upheld in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965).
" See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. title 2, §]] 17.50, 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1978)
(treble damages, subject to exceptions designed to protect warranting party who acts reasona-
bly and in good faith).
- Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719(2); UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS AT § 2-517(c) (if agreed remedy
fails of its essential purpose, other remedies may be used). Attempts to disclaim responsibility
for consequential damages stemming from personal injuries are usually viewed with suspi-
cion. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
21 But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118(e) (West 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §
10-204(b) (1974); VA. CODE § 55-70.1(E) (Supp. 1979) (statutory one-year warranties). Some
cases say that the warranties last for a reasonable time. See Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co.,
479 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Mo. 1972); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d
803, 809 (1967); Taveres v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975). UNIFORM LAND
TRANSACTONs ACT §§ 2-309 & 2-521 uses the "ascertainable date" approach.
25 Compare MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(c) (1974) (statute begins to run when
defect discovered or should have been discovered, or when warranty expires, whichever is
first), with VA. CODE § 55-70.1(E) (Supp. 1979) (statute begins to run when "breach" occurs),
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breach occurs and the event constituting a breach is not specified, the
limitation period is indeterminate." If it begins to run only when the
breach is actually discovered, lengthy limitation periods may result and
warrantees may be protected against their own lack of diligence.
Finally, the duration of the limitation period could be set forth in the
warranty act, or it could be left to more general statutory provisions.3 The
former approach has the advantage of certainty and of formulating a pe-
riod tailored to the problem at hand. The more general statutory approach
might be preferable if a suitable statute of limitations already exists in the
enacting state.
III. THE DRAFT IMPLIED WARRATIES AcT
A. Text of the Act
1. Definitions
(a) A "builder" is a person who constructs or remodels a resi-
dence for the purpose of sale or long-term lease to another person
and not for the builder's own use.
(b) "Economic waste" occurs when the cost of repair substan-
tially exceeds the diminution in value caused by a defect.
(c) A "long-term lease" or leasehold interest is one created by
a lease expressly stated to be for a duration of two years or longer.
(d) A "residence" is a building constructed or remodeled for
human occupancy as a dwelling, and includes any fixture, de-
tached building or improvement appurtenant to the dwelling. It
includes a multiple-unit dwelling of not more than four dwelling
units [except when the multiple-unit dwelling is a condomi-
nium]. It does not include a mobile home, whether or not it is
attached to the realty.
(e) A residence is new if it has not previously been occupied,
other than temporarily pending a sale or long-term lease.
(f) A residence is remodeled when it undergoes a major im-
provement in quality or a substantial change in interior or exterior
and UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-521(b) (statute begins to run when buyer enters
into possession, in usual case).
3* See VA. CODE § 55-70.1(E) (Supp. 1979).
3' Limitation periods vary widely in actual and proposed warranty acts. Maryland and
Virginia have adopted two year periods. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-204(c) (1974);
VA. CODE § 55-70.1(E) (Supp. 1979). See also 6 PowELL, supra note 2, at 938.6[4] (one year
to 18 months would be appropriate for injury to property, somewhat longer for personal
injury); Bearman, supra note 12, at 576 (one year, to cover just a full seasonal cycle); Haskell,
supra note 12, at 651 (five years); UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONs AcT § 2-521(a) (six years);
Home Implied Warranty, supra note 19, at 220 (six years). The latter three would run from a
date certain, regardless of whether the defect was then discovered or discoverable; hence the
relatively long limitation periods. Connecticut leaves the limitation period to statutory provi-
sions not related specifically to implied warranties.
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design. Normal maintenance and cosmetic improvements do not
constitute remodeling.
(g) A residence is newly remodeled if a contract to sell or lease
it expressly includes remodeling as part of the bargain, or if the
contract to sell or lease it is entered into during remodeling or
within six months after all structural work and all painting and
wallpapering (except touch-up work) have been completed.
(h) A "seller" or "lessor" is a party who owns or controls a
residence when a contract is made to sell or lease it. In the case of
a residence not substantially complete (or still in the process of
remodeling) at the time of contracting, the builder is a seller or
lessor, as the case may be.
(i) A residence is uninhabitable when by reason of a defect or
defects it presents a serious hazard to the health or safety of its
occupants. A residence may be uninhabitable even though the
occupants continue to reside in it.
2. Implied Warranties for New and Remodeled Residences
(a) In every contract for the sale or long-term lease of a new
residence, the seller or lessor warrants that at the time the in-
tended occupant takes possession (or would take possession if the
premises were habitable) the residence is:
(i) free from defective building materials (including latent
defects),
(ii) constructed in a workmanlike manner,
(iii) constructed according to sound engineering standards,
(iv) constructed in compliance with local housing, building,
health and safety laws, and
(v) fit for human habitation.
(b) In the case of a contract for the sale or long-term lease of
a newly remodeled residence, the warranties in subsection (a)
apply to all parts of the residence affected by the remodeling.
(c) The seller or lessor does not warrant against conditions
discoverable by reasonable, nonexpert inspection at the time of
contracting.
(d) If more than one person is a seller or lessor within the
meaning of section 1(h), each is a warranting party under this
section, and each is jointly and severally responsible for any
breach.
(e) When a contract is followed by a conveyance, the warran-
ties are not merged into the conveyance.
3. Beneficiaries of the Warranties
The warranties created by section 2 extend to the first pur-
chaser (or lessee in the case of a long-term lease) of the new or
remodeled residence who intends to occupy all or part of it as a
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dwelling, or who intends any member of his immediate family so
to occupy all or part of it. The warranties extend also to any such
member of his immediate family.
4. Assignment of the Warranties
(a) Rights under the warranties created by section 2 may be
assigned by the purchaser or lessee, provided that the assignee has
some direct personal or pecuniary interest in the premises.
(b) A contract to transfer ownership, or a long-term lease or
assignment thereof, which does not expressly exclude an assign-
ment of rights under the warranties assigns them (insofar as they
have not theretofore effectively been assigned) to the transferee or
lessee when the transfer, lease or assignment of lease becomes
effective, if he intends to occupy the premises as a dwelling. Such
a warranty assignment shall be not only for his benefit, but for the
benefit of the members of his immediate family who intend to
occupy the premises as a dwelling.
5. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(a) Any warranties created by section 2 may be excluded or
modified by agreement of the parties. Such agreement must be
evidenced by conspicuous writing separately signed by the buyer
or lessee. The writing must describe the warranty excluded or mo-
dified, and must accurately explain, in terms understandable to a
nonlawyer, the effect of excluding or modifying the warranty.
(b) The exclusion or modification of any warranty created by
section 2 shall not be inferred from the inclusion of an express
warranty in the agreement.
(c) The parties may not exclude or modify the warranties cre-
ated by section 2 before the residence is substantially completed
or remodeled, as the case may be. Any attempt to do so is ineffec-
tive.
6. Notice of Breach of Warranty
Unless the residence is uninhabitable and is never occupied by
a beneficiary of the warranty, all remedies for breach of an express
or implied warranty are barred if notice of the facts allegedly con-
stituting the breach is not given to the warranting party within a
reasonable time after the breach'is or should have been discovered.
7. Remedies for Breach of Warranty
Subject to sections 6 and 8, the remedies for breach of an ex-
press or implied warranty upon a residence covered by this Act are
as follows:
(a) If the residence is rendered uninhabitable by the breach
and is therefore condemned by the appropriate authorities, the
first purchaser (or first lessee) may elect to rescind in lieu of recov-
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ery under subsection (b) or (c). In such case the warranting party
may set off the reasonable rental value of the residence for the
period of occupancy. No assignee, or beneficiary other than the
first purchaser (or first lessee), may elect to rescind.
(b) If the defect can be repaired without economic waste the
measure of damages is the cost of repair.
(c) If repair entails economic waste the measure of damages
is the difference between the market value of the residence as
warranted and its actual market value when the defect is or should
have been discovered, whichever occurs first.
(d) If the measure of damages in subsection (b) or (c) would
result in unjust enrichment to any party, the measure shall be
reduced or eliminated accordingly.
(e) Incidental damages may be recovered for any breach.
(f) If a reasonable request to repair has been given to a war-
ranting party and that party has failed to repair the breach within
a reasonable time, consequential damages may be recovered.
(g) Notwithstanding subsection (f), consequential damages
for personal injury to a person entitled by section 3 or 4 to benefit
from the warranty may be recovered whenever a breach results in
such an injury.
(h) Punitive or exemplary damages may not be recovered ab-
sent proof by the complaining party of fraud on the part of the
warranting party.
8. Limitation of Remedies and Liquidation of Damages
(a) The parties may agree to limit remedies for breach of war-
ranty under section 2, but the agreed remedy is effective only if it
is reasonable in light of the harm actually caused by the breach.
(b) The parties may agree to a liquidated damages provision,
which is effective if the amount agreed upon is reasonable in light
of the harm actually caused by the breach.
(c) A provision for the limitation of remedies or liquidation of
damages must be conspicuous and separately signed by the buyer
or lessee to be effective.
(d) The parties may not exclude consequential damages for
personal injuries resulting from a breach of warranty.
9. Limitation of Actions
(a) Actions for breach of warranty under section 2 must be
brought within two years after the cause of action has accrued.
(b) Where a warranting party undertakes to repair, the cause
of action accrues 60 days thereafter, if the defect then remains
unrepaired.
(c) In all other cases, the cause of action accrues at the time
a defect is or should have been discovered, whichever occurs first.
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(d) The parties to the contract may extend the period set
forth in subsection (a); or they may limit it to a period of not less
than one year by a conspicuous writing separately signed by the
buyer or lessee.
10. Binding Effect of Agreements as to Nonparties
Any agreement effective under sections 5, 8 and/or 9(d) binds not
only the parties to it, but all warranty beneficiaries and all assign-
ees.
B. Commentary to the Act
The Act rests on three basic assumptions. (a) The person who makes a
substantial outlay for residential construction is at least as deserving of
protection as the person who makes a substantial outlay for new goods. In
both cases the person who receives the product is likely to be a less efficient
risk-avoider and information-gatherer than the one who provides it. (b)
There is no reason to distinguish between the quality of new construction
in new homes and the quality of new construction in existing homes that
are substantially remodeled and put on the market at a time when the
remodeling clearly enters into the bargain. Nor is there any reason to
distinguish between homes that are purchased in fee simple and homes
that are leased as long-term residences, especially in an age when high
home prices increasingly drive families into the rental market. (c) The
protective purposes of the Act should be accomplished with as little intru-
sion into the parties' freedom to bargain as possible. This implies that the
buyer or long-term lessee should not be protected from defects that ought
to be apparent to him, or from disclaimers he knowingly makes when
adequate information is available to him.
The section-by-section analysis below focuses only on the particularly
significant or controversial issues resolved by the Draft.Act. The numbers
are keyed to the section numbers in the Act.
1. Definitions
A builder may be a corporate or a natural person. The body of the Act
does not refer to builders, but the definition of "seller" or "lessor" does,
and the body of the Act refers to sellers and lessors. Hence the need to
define "builder."
The long-term lease definition reflects the Act's intent to protect only
those who acquire a substantial interest in a dwelling. The Act is not
designed to address the question of warranties on rental property generally.
Consequently, to be eligible for warranty protection, leases should exceed
the standard one-year term. A two-year minimum insures that only sub-
stantial possessory interests will be covered.
"Residence" is defined broadly enough to include fixtures, detached
garages, septic tanks and other improvements (including improvements to
the land, such as grading) that may not be part of the main building but
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are clearly intended for use with it. There is no rational basis for implying
warranties as to some improvements-such as those incorporated into the
main structure-but not as to others similarly designed to enhance the
property's habitability.
"Residence" includes not only single-family dwellings, but also small
multiple-unit dwellings, since they are essentially indistinguishable from
the former if the purchaser (or long-term lessee) or his family intends to
live in one of the units-as would be required under section 3 if he or his
family is to have the benefit of the warranties. The upper limit of four units
appears also in the Uniform Land Transactions Act, and reflects the prin-
ciple that protection should be afforded only to those whose primary reason
for buying a dwelling is to find a place to live. Those who buy larger
multiple-unit dwellings, or who do not intend to live in the dwelling, are
normally equipped to assume or avoid the risk of defects about as effi-
ciently as the builder or seller. That is generally true also of those who buy
commercial buildings.
The bracketed language in section 1(d) could be included in a state that
has a separate condominium act, and would relegate condominium war-
ranties to that act. If there is no such act, or if it is silent as to warranties,
the bracketed language could be deleted. Mobile homes are excluded be-
cause they are normally treated as goods under the Uniform Commercial
Code.
For reasons given below, the warranties extend only to new and remod-
eled residences. It is necessary to define "new" in such a way as to prevent
a builder or someone acting for him from occupying a building temporarily
in order to defeat the warranties. A residence is new if it fits the definition
in section 1(e), whether or not it is sold before construction is completed.
The definition of remodeling is designed to exclude normal repairs and
such cosmetic maintenance as painting. These are not of sufficient magni-
tude to require special protection. A residence is still "newly remodeled,"
however, for six months after the cosmetic work that completes the remod-
eling has been finished. This should avoid circumvention of the warranty.
The definition of "seller" and "lessor" reaches not only someone with
actual title, but someone in control of the premises without benefit of title
at the time of contracting. This should prevent liability avoidance through
the juggling of title. In the case of an incomplete residence, the builder is
included even if he does not technically own or control the premises, since
in such cases the buyer relies on him for construction work that cannot
then be inspected. Construction lenders are not within the definition un-
less they are in control of the premises when the contract is made; thus,
in the absence of such control, they would not be liable for a breach of
warranty.
2. Implied Warranties for New and Remodeled Residences
The warranties are limited to new and remodeled residences, since
those are the cases in which buyers (or long-term lessees) deal with the
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person who has had it within his control to see that adequate materials and
techniques go into the construction work. Moreover, a buyer of such a
home is not as likely to discover defects before signing a contract as is a
buyer of a used home who must expect wear and tear.
The five listed warranties are intended to protect against the types of
defect that would defeat the buyer's reasonable expectations. Some of the
warranties partially overlap each other, but it seems preferable to err on
the side of possible redundancy than to risk creating gaps into which some
harmfully shoddy construction could fall untouched. Building materials
are included in the seller's warranty, to spare the buyer from having to
identify and pursue manufacturers or dealers with whom he is not in priv-
ity. The warranties would supplement protection afforded the buyer under
any other source of law.
The premises are warranted as of the time of possession, rather than
being warranted for some stated duration. By their nature, each of the
warranties will be breached, if at all, when the dwelling is ready for occu-
pancy or, to take a date more important to the buyer, when it is actually
occupied. The only reasons for warranting compliance for a stated period
beyond the time possession passes would be to give the buyer time to
discover any defects and to protect the seller from liability for defects
discovered long after he has lost control over the property. Section 9 of the
Draft Act covers these difficulties by giving the buyer time to discover
defects before the statute of limitations starts to run, and by protecting the
seller from liability for defects belatedly discovered (since the statute will
start to run when they should have been discovered). The warranties
"expire" eventually, when the limitation period in section 9 expires.
It is inefficient and unfair to require a seller or lessor to warrant against
conditions that should be reasonably apparent to the average buyer or
lessee. Consequently the warranties do not extend to conditions discovera-
ble by a reasonable, nonexpert inspection.
The draft Act contains no bonding or other suretyship requirement.
Such a requirement would not necessarily be inappropriate, but it raises
issues separate from those inherent in the creation of implied warranties
and thus should be treated, if at all, in a separate statute.
3. Beneficiaries of the Warranties
The warranties are linked to new construction. Consequently they di-
rectly benefit only the first purchaser and occupant members of his imme-
diate family. By virtue of the next section on assignment of warranties,
however, others may indirectly benefit.
4. Assignment of the Warranties
Warranties should be treated as normal contract rights, assignable at
least to those who will be adversely affected by any breach. Because of the
statute of limitations in section 9, the period will not be unduly long during
which valuable rights may be assigned. During that limited period, it is
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appropriate to presume that the potentially valuable rights are assigned
when there is a transfer of habitation, since the transferee and his family
are the ones who would suffer inconvenience and expense if there are latent
defects. The presumption is stated as a rule of law, but the transferor may
render it inapplicable by making clear his intent not to assign the warran-
ties.
5. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
The parties should be free to bargain, provided that they have adequate
information. Consequently this section permits them to exclude or modify
the implied warranties, subject to safeguards which insure that (a) the
buyer knows what he is signing (hence the requirements that the provision
be conspicuous, separately signed, specific and understandable); and (b)
the buyer can inspect the premises for defects if he wishes (hence the
preclusion of this type of bargain before the construction is substantially
finished).
6. Notice of Breach of Warranty
The warranting party should have a reasonable opportunity to cure any
breach before it is compounded by wear and tear or neglect. Hence the
notice requirement, on pain of loss of remedy. The only exception to the
notice requirement is the case in*which the house is uninhabitable and
never occupied.
7. Remedies for Breach of Warranty
If the remedy is not effectively defined in the contract under section 8,
there are several possibilities. The first, rescission, is limited to cases in
which the defect not only renders the premises uninhabitable, but causes
them to be condemned. This gives an effective remedy for the egregious
case, but ties it to an objective test-condemnation by the appropriate
authorities-in order to avoid any serious effect on the security of titles or
the availability of mortgage loans. Security of title is also served by limit-
ing the right of rescission to the first purchaser or first lessee.2
The usual remedy would be damages measured by the cost of repair. If
repair would entail economic waste (as defined in section 1(b)), recovery
would be measured by the diminution in market value caused by the
breach. Incidental out-of-pocket expenses attributable to the breach could
also be recovered, as could consequential damages when the warranting
32 For purposes of security of title, a carefully defined and limited right of rescission is
preferable to the situation as it presently exists in most states, where the courts may (as a
matter of common law) find a right of rescission without clearly defining its scope. See note
23 supra. The alternative would be to preclude rescission altogether, by statute. This seems
unnecessarily harsh when the premises are so badly constructed that they must be con-
demned.
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party fails to repair within a reasonable time or when the breach results
in personal injuries to a warranty beneficiary or assignee. In appropriate
cases, consequential damages could encompass not only personal injuries,
but property damage and foreseeable losses occasioned by the special
needs of the beneficiaries.
A provision has been included to prevent the unjust enrichment that
might otherwise occur if, for example, a lessee claims the cost of repair
under circumstances indicating that he will incur no such cost, directly or
indirectly; or a member of a buyer's family makes a similar claim when
the economic burden of the breach will not fall on that member.
8. Limitation of Remedies and Liquidation of Damages
The principle permitting parties to limit remedies and liquidate dam-
ages is essentially the same as that permitting them to exclude or modify
warranties, subject to safeguards. The safeguards serve the same purposes
in the two sections, but are slightly more protective of the buyer here than
in the case of excluding or modifying warranties. This section renders
unenforceable any agreed remedy or damage amount that becomes (with
hindsight) disproportionate to the actual harm, and does away with
clauses exonerating a warranting party from liability for personal injuries.
The latter reflects prevailing public policy, while the provisions requiring
proportionality between harm and remedy take advantage of the opportun-
ity for a "second look" to insure that the implied warranties have not
created essentially meaningless rights.
9. Limitation of Actions
The basic limitation period is two years. In most cases the statute
begins to run when the defect is or should have been discovered. The
exception arises when a warranting party undertakes to repair. In such a
case the statute does not begin to run until 60 days thereafter, in order to
avoid penalizing the warranty beneficiary who refrains from bringing suit
in reliance on the warranting party's promise to take care of the matter.
As provided in section 2(a), to be actionable at all the defect must have
existed at the time the intended occupant takes possession, or would do
so if the premises were habitable. Sections 2(c) and 9, however, make it
clear that the defect need not be discoverable at that time to be actionable.
The parties may vary the limitation period in their contract, but may
reduce it only by a writing that insures the buyer's (or lessee's) understand-
ing, and then only to a period long enough to prevent frustration of the
Act's protective purposes.
10. Binding Effect of Agreements as to Nonparties
If an agreement meets the tests for exclusion or modification of warran-
ties, limitation of remedies, liquidation of damages or alteration of the
statute of limitations, it should be binding on all interested persons, not
just on the immediate parties.
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IV. CONCLUSION
No statute can resolve every conceivable issue, and ours is no exception.
The goal should be to resolve each recurring issue in a manner that either
sets forth the socially desirable result or provides a meaningful standard
to be applied case by case when a strict rule would be too rigid. Our statute
contains both types of provisions. Examples of the former are found in the
definitions, the statement of the nature of the warranties in section 2, the
presumption of assignment in section 4(b), some of the limits on the par-
ties' bargaining power and the basic limitation period. Examples of the
latter include some of the individual warranties and the exclusion of dis-
coverable conditions from protection in section 2, the reference to the
buyer's immediate family in sections 3 and 4, the reasonable rental value
and unjust enrichment protections for the seller in section 7, the reasona-
bleness standard in section 8 and the reference in section 9 to the time
when defects should have been discovered. None of these standards is
novel to the law. Consequently, in disputed cases each should provide the
decision-maker with the necessary tools to reach a principled result that
is as cost-efficient as basic notions of fairness allow. Our law reform effort
aspires to no more than this.
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